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What is Preventing Homeland Security?
Christopher Bellavita
Abstract
Almost four years have gone by since the United States formally joined the global
war on terrorism. Yet something stops us from giving as much attention to preventing
terrorism as we give to preparing to respond to the next attack. One reason is a homeland
security system that is designed for response rather than prevention. Three fears hamper
efforts to reconfigure that system: the fear of new behaviors; the fear of imagination; and
the fear of emergence. Despite these barriers, we know more about prevention than most
people in Homeland Security are aware of. The Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland
Security, issued in 2003 by the DHS, identifies five elements of a cohesive prevention
strategy: collaboration, information sharing, threat recognition, risk management, and
intervention. These Guidelines provide a good initial framework for effective prevention.
We can continuously improve the Guidelines by transforming them from a proprietary to
an “open source” project within the public safety community.
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1“I don’t think you can win [the war on terror].”
– George W. Bush
“He was talking about winning it in the conventional sense ... about how this is a 
different kind of war and we face an unconventional enemy.”
– White House spokesman Scott McClellan1
May 20, 2005 passed with little notice in America.  It marked 1,347 days since the 
September 11th attack.  The same number of days separated December 7, 1941 from the 
end of the Second World War. This “different kind of war” will not end.  There is no 
politically palatable way for a leader to say, “OK, we won.  The Global War on Terror is 
over.  Everyone go back to Green.”
Like its semantic relatives the War on Drugs and the War on Poverty, the Terrorism 
War will last as long as there are homeland security industries, bureaucracies, and 
congressional committees.  And an enemy.  There is no war on terrorism without 
terrorists – considered now, under U.S. law and sentencing guidelines, as anyone whose 
action “appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population."2  Since a 
terrorist can include criminals who fly planes into buildings, detonate bombs at sporting 
events, set SUVs on fire, release laboratory animals, and make methamphetamines, we 
will never run out of terrorists.  
PREVENTION REMAINS OUR FIRST NATIONAL PRIORITY
Because we are in this for the long run, it is important to remember what we are trying to 
accomplish.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security published in 2002 identifies 
prevention as the first of four goals.  In April, 2005, Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff reaffirmed the importance and priority of prevention 
when he told Congress our homeland security strategy was to keep terrorists “off the 
boards, prevent them from coming in, prevent them from shipping their stuff in, 
protecting our infrastructure and transportation if they do get in, and then if worse comes 
to worst, … being able to respond the [sic] mitigate the harm.”3  In word, if not in deed, 
prevention remains our first priority.
After more time than we devoted to Word War II, how are we doing?  We  have not 
been attacked in almost four years.  By the end of 2005, we will have spent about 175 
billion dollars on homeland security.  Information sharing, while not perfect, has 
dramatically improved – at least among law enforcement agencies.  We have a dozen 
homeland security-related national strategies; fifty-plus state and territory strategies; 
thirteen homeland security presidential directives; and a growing mound of 
implementation guides, cloaked by such New Deal-sounding acronyms as NRP, NIMS, 
NPG, NIPP, UTL, and TCL. 
On the surface, our prevention strategy is working.  Look under the surface however, 
and one is hard pressed to identify what that prevention strategy is. 
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HAS ANYONE SEEN THE TERRORISM PREVENTION PLAN?
The Committee is concerned that while terrorism prevention is a national 
priority, little is being done to create prevention expertise in our nation's first 
responders.  This is in stark contrast to response and recovery training 
programs.  Without a well-developed terrorism prevention plan, State and local 
agencies lack a key piece in the fight against terrorism.
– House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, June 2004 4
Imagine a parallel universe where World War II is still going on.  There is a strategy 
meeting in President Roosevelt’s office.  The Director of the Office of Civilian Defense 
is speaking:
“When the German’s attack, Mr. President, here’s how we’ll be organized.  We will use 
the National System for Managing Any Incident….”
“Wait,” says the President, “First tell me how we will prevent the Germans from 
attacking.”
“Well,” says the Director, “our National System for Managing Any Incident has a strong 
prevention component.  Everyone will work together and share information.  But once 
we’re attacked….”
“Stop.  How do we prevent the attack in the first place?”
“Mr. President,” says the Director, “You’ll recall we have a National Response Plan, 
and….”
“I don’t want to respond,” says the President.  “I want to prevent.”
“The country has not been attacked since December 7th, Mr. President.  And the 
Germans have never attacked our homeland.  Our plans are working.”
Almost four years have gone by since the nation formally joined the global war on 
terrorism.  Yet something still is preventing us from giving as much – if not more –
attention to prevention as we give to preparing to respond to the next attack.  
One reason is money.  The political economy of homeland security is biased toward 
response.  A lot of money has been made selling equipment and services to first 
responders.  There is a much more limited economic market for prevention.  We do not 
know how much we are spending on prevention because we do not yet have a common 
understanding of what we do when we are preventing terrorism.  
The Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee quotation, above, alluded to a 
“terrorism prevention plan.”  What is that?  Where is it?  Why is it taking so long to put 
together?  What is preventing homeland security from preventing terrorism?
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IT IS THE SYSTEM, NOT THE PEOPLE
"We've got to have a prevention strategy that is focused on finding those 
terrorists before they act.  Very little, I will hasten to add, of what the 
Department of Homeland Security spends its money on these days is devoted to 
what ought to be a high priority.  We've got to reconfigure in order to do that."5
– Christopher Cox, [Former] Chairman of House Committee on Homeland Security 
It would be completely erroneous to say we do not have comprehensive national or 
local prevention plans because no one wants them.  It would be foolish to blame any 
person or institution for the failure to make prevention the first priority in more than 
name only.  There are many people at all levels of government who take with heart attack 
seriousness the prevention mission.  But we have been at this longer than WWII, and we 
still do not have a cohesive – or articulated – national prevention strategy.  Something is 
wrong.  
Edwards Deming, the continuous improvement authority, used to say, “We are being 
ruined by the best efforts of people who are doing the wrong thing.”  To Deming, systems 
rather than people were the problem.  “All that happens comes from the system, not the 
workers…,” he said.  “It’s absolutely frightening, … just frightening."6
The same dynamic is festering in homeland security: the best efforts of the best people 
are being applied to the wrong things.  As Christopher Cox, former Chairman of the 
House Committee on Homeland Security suggests, the homeland security system is not 
designed to support prevention as its first priority.  It is designed to respond.  It is 
leadership’s job to reconfigure the homeland security system, to make the system’s 
outputs conform to the priorities of our national strategy.  
“Reconfiguring the system” does not mean simply reorganizing the Department of 
Homeland Security.  A secure homeland is the outcome of national, state, local, private 
sector and citizen activities.  It is not the sole responsibility of any national, state or local 
agency.
Deming argued for the preeminence of process.  If you understand system processes, 
he said, you can figure out what needs to be done to continuously improve that system.  
Before trying to redesign the entire homeland security apparatus, however, it may be 
helpful to examine three systemic fears that get in the way of discovering how the
activities of that system – the process – can match the espoused priority of prevention.  
They are the fear of new behavior, the fear of imagination, and the fear of emergence.
THE FEAR OF NEW BEHAVIOR
In late 2004, public safety executives from a mid western state participated in a homeland 
security tabletop exercise.  The first scenario was designed to stimulate conversation 
about how to prevent a potential attack from happening.  The discussion was low energy 
and uninspired.  Participants were unsure how to talk about prevention.
But then an attack scenario was presented.  The exercise moved into response and 
recovery.  Participants became animated.  They talked faster, had more detailed 
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knowledge, and were professionally confident.  They demonstrated they knew what to do 
once an incident has happened.  
The same pattern was repeated in more than a dozen similar state homeland security 
exercises: people participating in the exercises could not grab hold of “prevention” with 
the same emotion they poured into “response.”  The reason?  The public safety leaders 
had a lot of experience responding to critical incidents.  They had practically no 
experience sharing at least awareness that they were doing prevention. 
New Roles, New Behaviors
Preventing terrorism is a new role for public safety agencies.  They are used to 
responding to daily emergencies, not stopping acts of war.  As a generalization, one can 
say they tend to avoid prevention because they already know how to do response.  It is 
partially a learning problem.  Adults and organizations prefer doing things they already 
know how to do – even if that means redefining the “new” so it looks like the old; hence 
the demand for new and better response equipment – whether or not it can be used or 
maintained. 
The United States has the world’s best disaster response system.  With the possible 
exception of a wide scale biological or cyber attack, we can meet the challenge of any 
incident – no matter how horrendous.  That does not mean we have finished improving 
our response system.  But continuing to make response our de facto priority is like  
searching for lost car keys under a street light because the light is better there.  We know 
much less about how to prevent.  It is in this Terra Incognito we can make the most 
progress expanding our capability to secure the homeland.
We have a Roadmap for Prevention
While prevention may be a new public safety idea, we know more than most people in 
homeland security are aware of.  In 2003, the DHS issued Preparedness Guidelines for 
Homeland Security.  The Guidelines have three features that make it unique among the 
paniculated documents produced since September 11th.  It was built from the ground up 
by first preventers.  It was vetted by first preventers.  It gave other public safety 
professionals practical advice about how to prevent terrorism.  For some reason, the 
Guidelines are also largely unknown in the homeland security community. 
The Guidelines identifies five elements of a prevention strategy: collaboration, 
information sharing, threat recognition, risk management, and intervention.  Each of 
these elements is further divided into specific activities that support the prevention 
strategy.  The two core elements of those Guidelines – collaboration and information 
sharing – cost comparatively little in monetary terms.  They mostly require people, 
organizations and professions to change their attitudes and behaviors.  The core elements 
work only when there is a committed effort to change.  Their success is more a function 
of sociology than technology.
The Guidelines can be a foundation for developing local prevention plans.  Some 
jurisdictions – in Kansas City, KA and Frederick County, MD, for example – have 
already used the Guidelines this way.  
The Guidelines also can help with the thorny problem of how to measure prevention.  
The prevention activities included within each of the five elements are empirically 
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derived proxies for prevention.  If the elements are present and working effectively in a 
jurisdiction, there is a greater likelihood a process is in place to prevent terrorism.
The Prevention Guidelines – or something similar – are as important to homeland 
security as the National Incident Management System (NIMS).  The national government 
threatens to withhold funds to jurisdictions that are not “NIMS compliant.”  If prevention 
is so important, the Grant Threat strategy could be extended to agencies – and the private 
sector (perhaps with what amounts to a tax penalty) – that are not “prevention 
compliant.”  The Prevention Guidelines make concrete what it means to prevent 
terrorism.
THE FEAR OF IMAGINATION
The 9/11 Commission Report cited the failure of imagination as one of four failures 
revealed by the attack.  The post 9/11 spending hemorrhage has fertilized imaginative 
technology – although there is no evidence the absence of technology contributed 
significantly to the September attacks.  At the national level, there have been no 
especially imaginative innovations in policy, strategy or how we are organized to prevent 
terrorism.  The NIMS is a modification of a thirty-year-old template for responding to 
emergencies.  The lackluster “Vision for the National Preparedness Goal” reads like a 
“what-not-to-do” example in a government writing class.  Merging 22 agencies into one 
is – although on a major league scale – a traditional organizational response to not 
knowing for sure what to do.
If this truly is, as presidential spokesman Scott McClellan asserts, “a different kind of 
war,” we are still fighting it with old ideas, old structures, and old methods.  Four years 
and counting.  Where is the imagination that the 9/11 Commission called for?
Here are two ideas: confront the American people with the reality of what terrorism can 
do to our society, and use free market ideas to predict the risk of specific attacks.
“… nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror”
Prevention has to mean more than just stopping attacks.  It also ought to mean 
preventing terrorists from achieving the goals their attacks are meant to accomplish. 
How would Americans react economically, politically, and socially if twenty suicide 
bombs went off within the same hour in shopping malls all over the country?  What if 
smallpox starts to show up?  Or if transit systems in our cities are attacked like London’s 
or Madrid’s?  What if car bombs start detonating in American cities with the frequency 
they explode in Iraq?  What happens if an airplane is shot down as it takes off from an 
American airport?
It would cost about 40 billion dollars to install missile defense systems on the nation’s 
commercial air fleet over the next two decades to protect against shoulder fired missile 
attacks.  Experts are split over the likelihood of such an attack.  But there is general 
agreement that the central justification for even considering such an expenditure is 
because “of the enormous economic consequences that would result if the public were to 
lose confidence in flying.7”  The terrorist target is not the airplane, or the mall, or the 
subway.  Bin Laden has made his goal clear.  The target is our economy: “We bled 
Russia for ten years until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat….  We 
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are continuing in the same policy to make America bleed profusely to the point of 
bankruptcy."8
Thomas J. Housel and Arthur H. Bell argue, in “Limiting the Impact of Terrorist Acts: 
Accessing the Wisdom Base of a Hardened U.S. Populace,” that the American people are 
insufficiently prepared to prevent the economic and social disruption such an attack 
would create.9  History teaches that people as well as critical infrastructure can be 
hardened against terror.  If the enemy wants to wreck our economy by making people 
afraid to take the subway or go to malls, part of our approach to prevention should be to 
undercut the power of the terrorist strategy by toughening people against what is likely to 
happen again in our lifetime.  If we are in a real, not a symbolic, war, men and women 
and children will die.  Trying to protect Americans from that truth – as we do with the 
casualties of the Iraq war – eviscerates one of the fundamental weapons in our prevention 
arsenal.  
Stephen Flynn suggests we are in a “phony war” period similar to the eight months 
after the Germans invaded Poland in September 1939.  Read or listen to what Winston 
Churchill told the British people: “I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and 
sweat.”  His prediction was correct, but the residents of London went on with their lives 
in spite of daily Luftwaffe air raids.  Compare that to the fuzzy way we have prepared 
American citizens for the next attack – and for what they can do about helping to prevent 
the attack and – more importantly – the consequences of an attack.
Placing Bets on the Second Attack
The most imaginative strategic idea for fighting terrorism we have so far seen was the 
Policy Analysis Market (PAM), incorrectly known as “terrorism futures.”  It was 
designed to use speculative markets to forecast geopolitical trends.  People who did not 
know what they were talking about perceived it as a way to bet on terrorist attacks.10  The 
PAM was an effort to create decision markets about the potential consequences of policy 
actions.  It was premised on the assumption that markets are efficient and effective 
aggregators of information.  Empirically, markets do a better job of assessing risks than 
reports or experts.  It does not get much more American than calling on free market 
concepts to help prevent terrorism.
But what a ruckus this new idea caused.  It was cancelled one day after the project 
came to the attention of the mainstream press.  One might debate the pros and cons of 
decision markets as a way to look at prevention policies.  But that debate never happened.  
Do we have such a surplus of ideas that we are incapable of withholding judgment long 
enough to listen to what the idea is before it is killed?  What other innovative ideas about 
policy, strategy, and organization have been blocked by homeland security mind guards?
If public sector decision markets prove to be an advance on our current policymaking 
capabilities, homeland security will eventually adopt them.  But who knows how much 
time will go by – how many questionable decisions made – before then.  In theory, some 
of the initial stakeholder confusions and disagreements over NIMS, the Target 
Capabilities List, and other DHS efforts could have been minimized if decision futures 
markets would have been encouraged to weigh in.  But we will never know.
The larger problem is not how the DHS writes rules.  It is a system-wide bias against 
imagination.  This can be addressed, in theory, by a commitment to “seek first to 
understand” ideas before killing them.  Perhaps a small reserve of seed funds could be 
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used for “imagination grants.”  These would be provided to communities, states, the 
private sector, and national government agencies – anyone who has an inventive and 
intellectually plausible idea about how to expand our capacity to prevent terrorism.11
The 9/11 Commission called for institutionalizing imagination.  That has not yet been 
done.  It needs to be.
THE FEAR OF EMERGENCE
During the past three years, many federal agencies … have made efforts 
to secure input and comments from the state, tribal, and local public safety 
community.  Unfortunately, these efforts are too often limited to 
participation in advisory panels and working groups that have little 
impact on policy development and instead are relegated to the role of 
providing post-development comments on completed, or nearly completed, 
policy proposals.  Consequently, the ability of state, tribal, and local law 
enforcement to truly influence policy has been minimized.12
The third fear is the dread of what happens if you stop trying to control everything.  It is 
based on a proposition demonstrated by experience time and again: control is not a 
property of complex human systems.  The social, political, and economic world is not a 
product of control.  It is the resultant of an emergent, self-organizing process.13  That does 
not mean homeland security professionals play no role in shaping the system.  But they 
are partners, not controllers.  Homeland security leaders can benefit from transforming 
their thinking from a hierarchical to a network mindset.
Envision the textbook pyramid of “How Our Government Works:” the national 
government is on top, telling the states what to do to the cities and counties.  Using the 
relatively new policy mechanism of the “presidential law,” otherwise known as 
Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD), the national government now tells 
states and cities what they need to do to secure the homeland.  States and cities have 
allowed this to happen for a variety of reasons – ranging from the perception that 
homeland security is little more than a way to get grant funds, to the authentic belief that 
it is the national government’s job to set the homeland security agenda.  
The national government, partly through default, partly through arrogance, and partly 
because of the career history of institutional leaders, has welcomed the opportunity to 
decide what is best for homeland security.  Most homeland security guidance documents 
are the product of this hierarchical mentality.  From the National Strategy through the 
HSPDs and the follow-on suite of implementation documents, the national government 
has been telling its subordinate units what to do.  
Because this is the 21st century, however, it is symbolically necessary to get “input 
from the locals.”  But as recent reports from the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Government Accountability Office, and the Congressional Research Service 
indicate, the well-meaning efforts at inclusion are largely unconvincing to those on the 
frontlines of homeland security.14
The dominant metaphor driving homeland security aspirations is “the well-oiled 
machine,” steered by an informed central authority.  It is based on the theory that if all 
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the parts – states, cities, private sector, citizens, and the national government agencies –
are operating from the same design (e.g., the NPG, NRP, NIMS, TCL, and so on) we will 
have one integrated system that will achieve the national homeland security strategy.
There are two problems with the metaphor and with the behavior it encapsulates.  
First, the machine is not designed to do what it should do: prevent terrorism.  It is 
designed predominantly to create and follow rules, and to spend money for response.  
Second, the exclusionary faith in hierarchy and control sustains a societal vulnerability 
our enemy has already exploited.  
The enemy is networked.  We are too, although we could get much better at it.15  Most 
people in homeland security know that the way things really get done is through personal 
networks.  But we still talk and act as if a smoothly functioning hierarchy ought to be our 
goal; blindly maintaining this almost-vestigial twentieth century idea gets in the way of 
preventing terrorism.
DHS policy says that money should go directly to states, to then be distributed to 
cities.  Politically powerful communities have found ways of effectively bypassing states 
and going directly to DHS, at times via Congress, at other times by creating the right 
relationships with DHS and other agency leaders.  Funding is as much the product of 
networks, as of hierarchies.  
Review the collection of recent state homeland security plans.16  Many of these plans 
were spurred by rather explicit DHS grant guidance.  Yet there is extraordinarily wide 
variation in the plans.  The best explanation for why plans were written as they were rests 
in understanding the network of people and agencies responsible for the plan, not the 
guidance from the national government.  
Monitor how states and cities and counties will implement NIMS.  For some 
communities, NIMS represents a modest extension of what they already are doing.  For 
others it represents a welcome lever to get all agencies to use the incident management 
system.  For still others, it represents yet another intrusive mandate to be worked around.  
One can predict that the future of NIMS will be the resultant of the same network 
processes that helped to shape the funding and the planning profiles.  It will not be 
controlled by the national government – not because control is or is not a good idea, but 
because control is not a property of a complex human system like homeland security. 
This is not an argument to eliminate hierarchy.  It is a suggestion that since the present 
system is having such a difficult time pursuing prevention, try something different.  
Instead of struggling to control what happens in homeland security, use the power of self-
organization to see what it can contribute to expanding our prevention capabilities.  Use 
the creativity of communities, states, the private sector, and homeland security 
professional associations to evolve the next iteration of the Prevention Guidelines.  Here 
is how that might work.
First the theory: Many DHS documents talk about the need for policies and strategies 
to “evolve” as time goes by.17  “Evolve” is in quotes to emphasize that it has a meaning 
beyond the general one of “change.”  From a theoretical perspective, the evolutionary 
process is quite specific: it includes variation, selection, and reproduction.18  The first 
requirement is for variation.  The homeland security system already has lots of that – in 
spite of efforts to minimize unplanned variation.  Another word for “selection” is “best 
practices” (or, more accurately, “smart practices”19).  If there is an effective process for 
sharing smart prevention practices, it is informal and underground.  It is possible to 
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develop a mechanism – beyond the DHS Lessons Learned website (www.llis.gov) – that 
targets a specific set of prevention ideas for possible selection by agencies willing to 
experiment.  The next step is for jurisdictions to adopt – or reproduce – particular smart 
practices that do work in their environment.  This is a naturalist rather than a mechanical 
model.  It is relying on intelligent, co-evolution rather than on intelligent design by 
committee.
Now the practice: The co-evolutionary approach does not require developing any new 
implementation strategy.  Instead, it represents taking the blinders away to see what is 
actually happening – networks are organizing homeland security, not hierarchies – and 
then cooperating with the reality of how things happen, rather than remaining faithful to 
an ideal about controlling complexity. 
Possibly the best example of co-evolution in homeland security is fusion centers.  
They were not mandated.  It just seemed like a good idea that agencies with something to 
contribute to situation awareness ought to talk with each other.  That “variation” of the 
pre 9/11 compartmentalized intelligence structure was voluntarily selected and 
voluntarily reproduced by other states and communities.20
The target for the self-organizing experiment would be the DHS Prevention 
Guidelines.  The 2003 Guidelines are not the last word in prevention.  They need to be 
continuously improved as we learn more about what works.  In early 2005, a draft 
Version 2 of the Guidelines was released by DHS – but then subsequently withdrawn.  
The DHS Lessons Learned web site could post the Guidelines as a “wiki” to allow broad 
input into the continuous improvement of what works in prevention.21
The idea is to make the Prevention Guidelines an “open source” rather than a 
proprietary project within the public safety community.  It is analogous to the 
development of the Linux computer operating system, where “Given enough eyeballs, all 
bugs are shallow”.22  We should foster as much variation of the Prevention Guidelines as 
possible.  Individual agencies would be encouraged to take the guidelines, adapt them to 
their jurisdiction, and add what they learn to the Guidelines.23  Let the public safety 
market of ideas determine what can be done at state and local levels to prevent terrorism.  
There have been endless documents produced by committees working inside 
cathedrals of homeland security orthodoxy.  Let us discover if the revised guidelines for 
preventing terrorism can organize itself, using the wisdom of the “great babbling bazaar 
of differing agendas and approaches” that makes up homeland security.24
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